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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
WENDELL NAVANICK, : Case No. 981398-CA 
Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Possession, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-38-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996). 
See Addendum A (judgment). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court erroneously deny Appellant's 
motion to suppress the controlled substance found on his person 
after he was arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable search and seizure? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit 
evidence seized as a result of a search implicating a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment right is a "mixed question of law and fact [] 
appropriately resolved under a bifurcated examination of, first, 
the predicate historical facts found by the trial court, weighed 
against a clearly erroneous standard, and, second, of the 
emerging legal conclusion, evaluated for correctness." State v. 
Vicril. 815 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991) (discussing bifurcated 
standard of review applied to mixed questions of fact and law in 
Fourth Amendment context). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Wendell Navanick7s ("Navanick") challenge to the 
admissibility of the evidence is preserved on the record ("R.") 
for appeal at 45-62, 290. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At a suppression hearing, Navanick moved to exclude evidence 
of a controlled substance (amphetamine) that was seized during a 
jailhouse search. R.45-62,290. The search was conducted after 
he was mistakenly arrested under a warrant for another person 
with the same name. Id. The trial court denied Navanick's 
motion. R.133-38 (findings of fact and conclusions of law), 140. 
Navanick entered a conditional guilty plea to possession pursuant 
to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); see also Utah R. 
Crim. P. ll(i) (1998). R.226-31,276. Navanick appeals the lower 
court's denial of his motion to suppress the controlled substance 
seized during the jailhouse search. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 3, 1997, at 7:00 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Bryan Bailey ("Bailey") received a telephone call from the 
manager of the Motel 6 at 600 South, 176 West, in downtown Salt 
Lake City. R.290[8-9]. The manager reported that several young 
women were coming and going from a particular room and was 
concerned about possible "pimping." R.290[8]. The manager 
indicated that the room, number 148, was registered to a man 
named Wendell Navanick, but did not offer any physical or other 
descriptive information about him. R.290[10]. 
Although Bailey claimed to have had previous "professional 
contact" with a Wendell Navanick, Bailey did not look into the 
matter further. R.290[11-12]. Instead, he assigned Officer Todd 
Mitchell ("Mitchell") from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Department ("SLCSD") vice unit to investigate. R.290 [12]. 
Although Bailey testified that he instructed Mitchell to go to 
the Motel 6 at 176 West, 600 South, Mitchell for some unexplained 
reason went to a different Motel 6 located at 1990 West North 
Temple. R.290[9,13,15]. 
Before departing for the motel, Mitchell ran a warrants 
check on Wendell Navanick and discovered one outstanding arrest 
warrant for telephone harassment issued out of the West Valley 
City Police Department ("WVCPD"). R.290[16]. The warrant named 
a "Wendall Navanick" (different spelling than Appellant's name) 
with a birth date of 11-27-71 and an address of 1985 South, 100 
East in Salt Lake City. R.191 (Addendum B - WVCPD arrest 
3 
warrant). 
In addition to the warrants check, Mitchell testified that 
he checked the SLCSD records. R.290 [16,31] . According to 
Mitchell, that record identified two birth dates tied to a single 
address but did not provide any physical information. R.290 [16-
18] . Mitchell never checked with the WVCPD where the warrant 
originated to see if their records contained a physical 
description that might explain the existence of the two birth 
dates, although the department was open and such information 
could have been easily accessed. R.290[34]. Mitchell likewise 
failed to contact the SLCSD Information Services Office, also 
open at that time, for a physical description.1 R.290 [33-34] . 
Mitchell was not otherwise familiar with anyone by the name of 
"Wendell Navanick." R.290[38]. 
Having verified the warrant, Mitchell set out for the Motel 
6 on North Temple accompanied by two other officers. R.290 [19] . 
He did not have the warrant with him. R.290[30]. He proceeded 
directly to room 148 and knocked on the door. R.290[20-21]. 
Appellant opened the door. R.290[21]. Mitchell saw two females 
in the room and asked the man to come out. Id. The man 
identified himself as Wendell Navanick, born 1-7-71. R.290[22]. 
He did not have any identification on him when he was approached 
by the officers. R.290[25]. 
1
 Although it is not clear from the record, Mitchell's 
testimony indicates that the internal SLCSD records that he 
accessed do not provide the same information that is accessible 
through the SLCSD Information Services Office. 
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Mitchell informed Navanick that he was under arrest for 
telephone harassment and cuffed him. R.290[22,29]. Navanick 
looked perplexed for a moment then informed the officers that 
they had the wrong person and that there was another Wendell 
Navanick who was probably the man they were after. R.290[22#30]. 
Not believing Navanick, Mitchell frisked him but found no 
contraband. R.290 [31]. Mitchell immediately took Navanick to 
jail. R.290[23]. Navanick requested that the two women in his 
room, his girlfriend and her sister, remain; Mitchell agreed. 
Id. Mitchell testified that other than the arrest warrant, he 
did not have probable cause to detain Navanick. R.290[30]. 
At the jail, Navanick was undergoing a standard jailhouse 
search incident to arrest when the booking officer informed 
Mitchell that there may be two Navanicks and that the warrant may 
be for another person than the one arrested. R.290 [24,25,27,37] . 
Mitchell did not cease the search however, and a small quantity 
of amphetamine was thereafter found on Navanick. R.290[45]. The 
substance was received into evidence and Navanick was booked for 
possession. R.290[64],203 (Addendum C - SLCSD booking sheet). 
Navanick was never booked for or charged with telephone 
harassment, the crime listed in the warrant. Id. 
Navanick moved to suppress the amphetamine found during the 
jailhouse search. R.45-62,290. Specifically, Navanick asserted 
that the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to the extent 
that the police proceeded unreasonably on the warrant for 
telephone harassment despite several indications that they had 
5 
the wrong individual. Id. Navanick further argued that Mitchell 
was obliged to take more measures to verify the identity of the 
subject named in the warrant. Id. 
The State countered that Mitchell took adequate measures to 
clarify the identity of the warrant's subject and, in any event, 
the evidence did not conclusively rule out the possibility that 
Navanick was not the intended subject of the warrant. R.290 [80]. 
To this end, the State cross-examined Navanick about his legal 
name, John Gutierrez, intimating that he sought to avoid arrest 
on this occasion by giving police the name "Navanick." R.290 [45-
52] . 
Navanick confirmed that his legal name is John Gutierrez, 
and that his social security number and all his affairs requiring 
his legal name (i.e. school records) are under that name. 
R.290 [46-47] . He explained that his mother changed his name 
while he was still an infant to Wendell Navanick, Jr., shortly 
after she started dating Wendell Navanick, Sr., although 
Navanick, Sr., is not his biological father. R.290[46]. Ever 
since that time, Navanick has always been known as Navanick, Jr. 
and, hence, gave that name to the police on the evening of July 
3, 1997. R.290 [48] . 
Appellant also testified that there is a second Navanick, 
Jr., also named after Navanick, Sr., born 11-27-71, and who is 
the subject of the telephone harassment warrant. R.290[51-52]. 
According to Appellant, he has never met the other Navanick, Jr., 
but knows that he lives in the Salt Lake City area. R.290 [48] . 
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Appellant also testified that he has been confused by the police 
for the other Navanick, Jr. on one prior occasion. Id. 
The court denied Navanick's motion to suppress. In so 
holding, it found that Navanick did not have any identification 
on him when arrested; that Mitchell took sufficient, reasonable 
steps to clarify the identity of the subject named in the 
warrant; that the officers had a valid warrant and reasonably 
believed they were arresting the individual intended in the 
warrant; that the evidence presented at the hearing was 
inconclusive as to whether the appellant was the subject of the 
warrant due to credibility issues arising from his conflicting 
testimony regarding his name, i.e. Gutierrez or Navanick; and, 
finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-11 (1995), see infra note 5, 
and Hill, it is not mandatory that officers take any other 
measures than those taken by Mitchell to clarify doubt regarding 
an individual named in a warrant. R.133-38 (Addendum D -
findings of fact and conclusions of law). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Navanick's motion to 
suppress evidence seized as a result of a jailhouse search 
incident to his arrest. Specifically, the arresting officer, 
acting pursuant to an arrest warrant, did not reasonably mistake 
Navanick for the actual, intended subject of the warrant. 
Accordingly, the arrest was executed in violation of Navanick's 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, and the 
evidence obtained as a result is inadmissible. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING NAVANICK'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO AN ARREST CONDUCTED IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHERE THE ARRESTING 
OFFICER DID NOT REASONABLY MISTAKE NAVANICK FOR THE SUBJECT 
OF THE WARRANT. 
The trial court erred in admitting the evidence seized as a 
result of the mistaken arrest of Navanick. Specifically, Officer 
Mitchell's error in arresting Navanick was not reasonable under 
the circumstances. Hence, the arrest is invalid under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the evidence 
seized thereto is inadmissible. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of all individuals 
to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
See also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 (securing the right against 
"unreasonable searches and seizures," requiring warrants based on 
"probable cause").2 
Evidence seized as a result of an arrest executed in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible under the 
doctrine of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree ("exclusionary 
rule"). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also State v. 
Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1995) (noting that in Utah 
2
 Appellant's discussion herein shall be limited to an 
analysis under the Federal Constitution. 
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"[t]he fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as enunciated in 
Wong Sun, [citation omitted], requires the exclusion at trial of 
evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendments"). The government bears the burden to show that an 
arrest is valid under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 
Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Fourth Amendment is implicated when, as in the present 
case, "the police purposely detain a person under the mistaken 
impression that he is someone else." Vathekan v. Prince George's 
County, 1998 WL 544765 *4 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Brower v. 
County of Invo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 
628 (1989)). The rule regarding mistaken arrests was set forth 
by the United States Supreme Court in Hill v. California, 401 
U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971): The mistaken 
arrest of an individual is not valid under the Fourth Amendment 
unless 1) the arrest was justified at its inception by probable 
cause3 and 2) the officers' mistake was reasonable and made in 
good faith. 401 U.S. at 802.4 
Where officers act pursuant to a facially valid arrest 
warrant, the probable cause prong of the Hill analysis is 
3
 A seizure cannot be retroactively justified by evidence 
obtained as a result of the seizure itself. See United States v. 
Delcradillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir. 1988). 
4
 The Utah Code likewise requires that an arrest pursuant to 
a warrant be reasonable. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-11 (1995) 
provides, "[a]ny peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding 
warrant of arrest may arrest a person he reasonably believes to be 
the person described in the warrant, without the peace officer 
having physical possession of the warrant." (emphasis added). 
9 
satisfied. The question then becomes "whether it was reasonable 
for the arresting officers to believe that the person arrested 
was the one sought." Gero v. Henault, 740 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st 
Cir. 1984) (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) .5 As explained by the 
5
 The trial court found that the warrant was valid. R.137. 
Navanick, however, does not concede its validity. A valid warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment must particularly describe the person to 
be arrested. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 14 S.Ct. 752, 38 
L.Ed. 643 (18 94). Whether a warrant meets the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment "depends upon the particular 
circumstances" of each case. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972 
(Utah App. 1989) (discussing particularity requirements for search 
warrants) (citing State v. Anderson, 701 P. 2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 
1985)). Generally, a warrant that correctly names the arrestee is 
adequate. See Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 
1981) . However, a warrant that incorrectly names the subject is 
not valid unless accompanying affidavits provide additional 
information that clarifies his or her identity. Id. 
In the present case, the warrant did not correctly name the 
arrestee to the extent that it misspelled the name as "Wendall 
Navanick;" the correct spelling is "Wendell." R.191. Moreover, 
the warrant was not accompanied by any information, such as an 
affidavit, that could cure the deficit in information identifying 
the subject of the warrant. Id. Although the warrant itself 
provided a birth date and address, as discussed herein, neither 
piece of information conformed to other information obtained by the 
officer (i.e. - Mitchell was sent to a different address than the 
one listed on the warrant, R.290[9,13,15] , and the birth date was 
contradicted by another one indicated in a record referenced by 
Mitchell, R.290[16-18]). Accordingly, under the circumstances, the 
warrant did not adequately describe the arrestee with sufficient 
particularity to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
As noted in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373 (D.C. App. 
1975), where, as in the present case, 
an agent of the state makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant 
(assuming no independent probable cause), and the warrant 
fails, the arrest also must fail, for the agent's authority to 
make a proper arrest dies with the warrant. Good faith or 
reasonableness on the part of the arresting officer cannot 
remedy such an infirmity. 
Id. at 377 (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) . The arrest at issue 
here fails since the warrant is invalid and Mitchell, as he himself 
admitted, did not have probable cause to arrest Navanick that 
existed independently of the warrant. R.290[30]. Furthermore, 
even assuming Mitchell exercised good faith in executing this 
10 
Hill Court, "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the 
touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." 401 
U.S. at 803. Moreover, reasonableness is assessed in light of 
the totality of the circumstances. Id.6 
Under the foregoing analysis, the Hill Court held that 
officers acted reasonably when they arrested a person mistaken 
for petitioner Hill and seized evidence in a search incident to 
arrest, such would not be enough for the arrest to survive the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizure; Mitchell's "authority to make a proper arrest die[d] with 
the warrant." Sanders, 339 A.2d at 377. 
In addition to the foregoing, another aspect of this case 
undermines the validity of Navanick's arrest. In United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the 
Supreme Court established the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, upholding the admissibility of evidence seized 
as a result of an officer's reasonable reliance upon a search 
warrant that later turned out to be invalid. 468 U.S. at 925-26. 
In so holding, however, the Court expressly noted that the 
exception would not apply where a "warrant [is] so facially 
deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place [or person] 
to be searched or the things to be seized - that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Id. at 923. 
The hypothetical scenario envisioned by the Leon Court is the 
reality in the present case. Under the circumstances here and for 
reasons discussed above, the information provided in the warrant is 
"facially deficient" in that it fails to "particularize" the person 
to be arrested. Id. Hence, Mitchell could not "reasonably presume 
it to be valid." In acting on an obviously deficient warrant, 
Mitchell did not exercise good faith, and therefore the 
exclusionary rule applies to this case. Id. at 925-26. 
Yet, even assuming the validity of the warrant and/or 
Mitchell's good faith reliance thereon, the arrest is still illegal 
under the Fourth Amendment given the unreasonableness of the 
mistaken arrest of Navanick. See discussion infra. 
6
 "Totality of the circumstances" includes assessment of such 
factors as the "adequacy of the description of the suspect, time 
and place of arrest, and [the arresting officer's] action in the 
period immediately following the arrest", United States v. Valez, 
796 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1986), and the particular exigencies of the 
situation. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68, 69 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
11 
arrest that later led to Hill's conviction. 401 U.S. at 806. In 
that case, two robbery suspects implicated Hill and gave police 
information about Hill's address, age, appearance, the make of 
his car, and the presence of stolen goods in his apartment. Id. 
at 799. Four officers went to the address indicated and found a 
person matching Hill's description. In fact, the person was 
Archie Miller, who was waiting for Hill at the apartment. Id. 
Miller was arrested and asked about the contraband. Id. Miller 
said he was not Hill and claimed no knowledge of the stolen 
property, although guns and ammunition were sitting nearby in 
plain view. Id. Miller produced identification confirming his 
name, however the officers were not convinced and proceeded to 
search the premises. Id. 
Based on the evidence found as a result of the search, Hill 
was tried and found guilty of robbery. Id. at 800. The trial 
court held the evidence admissible on the basis that the officers 
reasonably mistook Miller for Hill and the evidence was 
discovered pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest. Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, stating "the police were 
entitled to do what the law would have allowed them to do if 
Miller had in fact been Hill, that is, to search incident to 
arrest and seize evidence of the crime the police had probable 
cause to believe Hill had committed." Id. at 804. 
In affirming the reasonableness of the mistaken arrest, the 
Court noted that the officers had probable cause to arrest Hill 
based on the informants' information, which included an address 
12 
and a "verified description" that coincided with the address and 
appearance of Miller. Id. at 802-03. The Court also found it 
significant that Miller denied knowledge of contraband even 
though guns and ammunition were sitting nearby. Id. at 803. 
Finally, with regard to Miller's proffer of identification, the 
Court stated that "aliases and false identifications are not 
uncommon" and, in light of his "evasive" answers regarding 
contraband in plain view, his "subsequent production of 
identification [was] entitled to little weight." Id. at 803, 
n.9. 
The instant case is distinguishable from Hill in that 
numerous factors bear against the reasonableness of the officers' 
mistaken arrest of Navanick and render the trial court's decision 
to admit the evidence an abuse of discretion. As an initial 
matter, Mitchell did not have the sort of corroborated 
information and "verified description" of the warrant's subject 
that rendered the officer's mistake in Hill reasonable. 401 U.S. 
at 802-03. Rather, the warrant and accompanying records provided 
conflicting information that left the identity of the subject 
substantially in question. 
For example, the WVCPD warrant indicated that the subject 
had a birth date of 11-27-71. R.191. The SLCSD records accessed 
by Mitchell, on the other hand, gave two birth dates, 11-27-71 
and 1-7-71.7 CJL. United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 26 (2d 
7
 According to Mitchell, the two birth dates were linked to 
a single address in the past and were characterized as aliases. 
Over Navanick's objection, the State was not compelled to produce 
13 
Cir. 1986) (citing Hill and noting that assessment of surrounding 
circumstances includes in part the "adequacy of the description 
of the suspect"). Moreover, Mitchell was dispatched to a Motel 6 
rather than the address listed on the warrant. Cf. Hill, 401 
U.S. at 802-03 (officer found mistaken arrestee at exact address 
provided by informant). 
Where most of the information on the warrant (birth date and 
address) was contradicted by other information, the primary 
justification for upholding the finding of reasonableness and the 
admiss ion of the evidence articulated in Hill, namely the 
corroborating information and "verified description" of the 
suspect, is lacking. Accordingly, the trial court erred finding 
that Mitchell reasonably mistook Navanick for the intended 
subject. 
In addition to the contradicted information in the warrant, 
Mitchell's unreasonableness in this case is underscored by the 
fact that he did not make any attempts to clarify the identity of 
the warrant's subject despite the obvious discrepancies. Where 
an officer has doubt that he is in pursuit of the right person, 
he "must make immediate reasonable efforts to confirm the 
suspect's identity." United States v. Glover, 725 F.2d 120, 123 
(C.A.D.C. 1984). 
"Immediate reasonable efforts," indeed common sense, under 
the circumstances would have entailed a simple telephone call to 
a written copy of the record referred to by Mitchell and, 
therefore, this information could not be cross-examined. 
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either the SLCSD Information Services Office or the WVCPD Records 
Department. In so doing, Mitchell could have immediately 
obtained a physical description of a Wendell Navanick, D.O.B. 11-
27-71, on the evening in question (7:30 p.m., July 3, 1997). 
R.201,211 (affidavits from WVCPD Records Department and SLCSD 
Information Services Office respectively regarding availability 
of descriptive information). 
In the present case, however, Mitchell did not take 
"reasonable efforts," Glover, 725 F.2d at 123, because he only 
accessed an internal SLCSD record that did not provide a physical 
description. R.290[31]. He did not call the SLCSD Information 
Services Officer, an entity organized to provide such 
information, nor did he contact the WVCPD Records Department 
although the warrant was generated by the WVCPD. 
The unreasonableness of Mitchell's inaction is underscored 
given that he had both the time and ability to make such a call. 
Mitchell testified that he was at the station when he received 
the call to investigate the matter at the Motel 6. Hence, he 
must have had immediate access to a telephone from whence he 
could call for a physical description of the man named in the 
warrant. Cf. Valez, 796 F.2d at 27 (mistaken arrest reasonable 
even though officer did not elicit physical description of 
suspect; officer only had access to radio in police van and could 
not communicate with other officers in field who could verify 
identity). Moreover, the evidence does not suggest that there 
was an extreme rush to apprehend Navanick, i.e., Navanick was at 
15 
a motel rather than in a moving vehicle or on the run. Cf. 
Patton v. Przvbvlski, 822 F.2d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(suspect in car and may have escaped had officer stopped to read 
all information on police report before apprehending him). Where 
the information on the warrant was discrepant, and where 
Mitchell had both the information and time at his disposal to 
obtain a physical description of the warrant's subject, he did 
not make adequately "reasonable efforts" to clarify the identity 
of the subject. Glover, 725 F.2d at 123. 
Indeed, the information available to Mitchell would have 
clarified that he did not have the man named in the warrant. 
That person was described in the WVCPD incident report and other 
records as 5'7" to 6'00" tall, "non-Hispanic" or "Indian," and 
approximately 140-50 pounds. R.196-200 (WVCPD incident report), 
207 (Utah criminal history record), 212 (SLCSD booking record). 
Appellant, by contrast, is Hispanic, only 5'5" tall, and weighs 
226 pounds, a difference of several inches and nearly seventy-
five pounds. R.203 (SLCSD booking record)8; cf. Glover, 725 
F.2d at 122-23 (reasonable mistake where arrestee resembled 
description of suspect); United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d 
618, 621 (4th Cir. 1982) (same). Where Mitchell failed to take 
the simple step toward identity verification by accessing 
8
 Bailey nor the Motel 6 manager that initially called in 
about the appellant did not offer any physical description that 
Mitchell could compare such information to prior to meeting him in 
person. However, the difference in weight and height would have 
alerted Mitchell that he had the wrong person once he met Navanick 
at the motel before he took him into custody. 
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information readily available by phone, the trial court erred in 
finding the mistaken arrest to be reasonable. 
Beyond the questions arising from proceeding on the warrant 
under these circumstances, the events that occurred during the 
arrest and at the jailhouse also undermine the reasonableness of 
Mitchell's error. Mitchell testified that when he initially 
approached Navanick at the Motel 6 and announced that he was 
under arrest for telephone harassment, Navanick appeared confused 
and protested that Mitchell had the wrong guy.9 R.290[22,30]. 
Navanick also urged Mitchell to compare his social security 
number ("SSN") with that of the man named in the warrant. 
R.290 [42] . 
The instant case is distinguishable from Hill, where the 
mistaken arrestee similarly told the police that he was not the 
man they were after and even produced identification to that 
effect. 401 U.S. at 799. In that case, the Court stated that 
the arrestee's claim of innocence was "entitled to little weight" 
because he gave "evasive" answers to police questions and 
disingenuously claimed no knowledge of obvious contraband lying 
in plain view. Id. at 803. 
Mitchell should have heeded Navanick's protest since the 
evidence presented at the hearing in the instant case, by 
9
 In fact, there are two people named Wendell Navanick, Jr. 
See R.206 (Addendum E - photo of appellant, born 1-7-71, taken 
night of arrest at issue) ; 211 (Addendum E - photo of second 
Wendell Navanick, Jr., born 11-27-71, when arrested for possession 
in February, 1993) (originals in exhibits envelope included in 
record). 
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contrast, did not indicate that Navanick's actions were suspect. 
In fact, contrary to Hill, Mitchell admitted that he did not 
observe any suspicious or evasive behavior to the extent that he 
testified that he did not have probable cause to arrest Navanick 
for the alleged prostitution. R.290[30]. Mitchell also 
testified that he did not find any weapons or contraband on 
Navanick when he frisked him at the motel. R.290[31]. 
The exigencies of the situation, moreover, did not warrant 
discounting Navanick's statement. According to Mitchell, he was 
accompanied by two other officers. With three officers total on 
the scene, one could have easily called in about the SSN while 
the other two watched Navanick. Cf., Patton v. Przvbylski, 822 
F.2d 697, 698-700 (7th Cir. 1987) (exigency of situation, 
combined with risk of nighttime highway arrest executed by an 
officer acting alone, rendered mistaken arrest reasonable despite 
arrestee's claim that officer had the wrong person). Where 
Navanick was contained and outnumbered by officers, and where the 
particular situation did not present the risk of flight or 
physical danger, Mitchell was not reasonable in discounting 
Navanick's statements. Indeed, had Mitchell taken the time to 
check the aforementioned records of the WVCPD and the SLCSD, he 
would have discovered that the subject's SSN was different than 
Navanick's. Compare R.197 (WVCPD incident report providing 
warrant subject's SSN) with R.203 (SLCSD booking report providing 
appellant's SSN). 
Other more telling indications of the unreasonableness of 
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the mistaken arrest, and indeed Mitchell's bad faith dealings in 
this matter, is that an officer at the jail notified Mitchell, as 
Mitchell conducted the pat-down search that later revealed the 
amphetamine, that there may be two people by the same name. 
R.290 [24,25,27,37] . However, without stopping to verify that 
Navanick was in fact the person named in the warrant, Mitchell 
carried on with the search until he found the substance. Id. In 
so doing, Mitchell failed to carry out his duty to immediately 
dispel doubts that he may have as to the identity of the subject 
of a warrant. See supra Glover, 725 F.2d at 123 (where officer 
has doubt as to identity of arrestee, he or she "must make 
immediate reasonable efforts to confirm the suspect's identity"). 
A final and telling aspect of this case highlighting Mitchell's 
bad faith is that Navanick was never booked for or charged with 
telephone harassment, the crime set forth in the warrant. R.203, 
290 [64] . 
In light of the foregoing considerations, the trial court 
erred in finding the mistaken arrest of Navanick to be 
reasonable. The evidence highlights that Mitchell did not act 
with a "sufficient probability" that he had the right man named 
in the warrant when he arrested Navanick. Hill, 401 U.S. at 802. 
Indeed, a number of factors indicate his bad faith dealings in 
this matter. Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence seized as a result of a search incident to arrest 
conducted in violation of Navanick's Fourth Amendment rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Navanick respectfully requests this 
court to reverse the trial court's decision and remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this %-LL day of January, 1999. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 3 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box 140230, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, 
this %i& day of January, 1999. 
CATHERINE L. B E G I C ^ 
DELIVERED copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah 
Attorney General's Office as indicated above this day of 
January, 1999. 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WENDELL NAVANICK, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 971015158 FS 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Date: July 13, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: daleeng 
Prosecutor: NICK DALESANDRO 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RALPH DELLAPIANA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 7, 1971 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 05/18/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 971015158 
Date: Jul 13, 1998 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $625.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $531.25 
Due: $1156.25 
Total Fine: $625.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $531.25 
Total Amount Due: $1156.2 5 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 1 year(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report on July 15, 1998 at 3.00 p.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $1156.25 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Pay fine to THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Page 2 
Case No: 971015158 
Date: Jul 13, 1998 
Enter and complete inpatient substance abuse program (ATC , 
salvation army or as by AP&P with aftercare. 
Receive vocational rehabilitation. 
Complete GED. 
Maintain full time employment/schooling. 
Release to AP&P for transportation to a drug program when a bed 
space is available. 
ORAL ARGUMENT MOTION TO STAY is scheduled. 
Date: 07/15/1998 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W46 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Dated this Yb day of 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)238-7300. 
sag* 
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ADDENDUM B 
UV Dept ID:%?-985? JfiN 26 *S 13:33 No.005 P.CP 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
David L. Clark (6199) 
John W. Huber (7226) 
West Val ley City Prosecutors 
3600 Const i tut ion Boulevard 
West Val ley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATS OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, TOST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WENDALL HAYAHICX 
1985 SOUTH 200 EAST 
SLC UT 84115 
11/27/71 
Defendant. 
WARRANT OF ARREST 
Bail $ I^OTt^ 
Case No. 961002627 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHALL OR POLICE OFFICER IN THE STATE; 
Information, upon oath, having been made, by DAVID L. CLARK, that the 
offense(s) of has or have been committed, and accusing WENDALL NAVANICX 
thereof. 
You are therefore commanded to arrest the above-named KENDALL NAVANICK 
and bring Defendant before said Court forthwith. 
WITNESS,, The Honorable Judge of the above entitled Court. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
VICITM, ' PAUL MILLER, STATED TO OFFICERS THAT THE DEFENDANT, WITH THE 
INTENT TO ANNOY, ALARM, OFFEND, INTIMIDATE, HARASS, THREATEN OR FRIGHTEN HIM, 
CALLED HIM ON THE TELEPHONE AND THREATENED TO DO BODILY'INJURY TO HIM AND USED 
FOUL AND ABUSIVE LANGUAGE TOWARD HIM; THE DEFENDMHyj^IIJED TO APPEAR FOR 
ARRAIGNMENT WITH JUDGE NEHRING. SUMMONS WAS 
ORDERED THE CITY TO PREPAR^ WARRANT OF ARRE 
DATED this day of 
SUB1 
*JXOMPL*IM 
rBED and SWORN to before me VkX 
THEREFORE THE COURT 
1997. 
1997, 
\2x 
ADDENDUM C 
SALT LA JE COUNTY 10 
BOOKING AND PROPERTY RECORD 
; DEFENDANT'S 
IIEXHIBIT i 
2*£ mt W&MtfT 
ME 
NAVIN1CK, WliNOKLL NMN 
ooe 
0 1 / 0 / / / I 
DATE BOOKED 
0 7 / 0 3 / 9 / 
TIME 
£ 1 0 4 
INCIDENT REPORTING NO. 
9 / 9 9 S / 1 
BOOKING NO. 
9 / 1 4 9 4 ? 
S.O. NO. 
1 Wb>>U 
| A K A S . A V ] N ] C K , JOHN 
AKA, IROOPY 
GUTTILRRL; / : , JOHN K I M 
WAV) N I C K , Wl.NtHl.L NHN 
ARREST DATE 
0 7 / 0 3 / 9 7 
TIME 
I 9 i b 
ARREST LOCATION 
1990 W NOR'IH ILMPl I 
ARRESTING OFFICER 
M H C H L U . , T . C 
*MAttlSl:S 
1 
OFFIC€RIO. 
1S7V 
AGENCY 
SI C POL1CL 
FBI NO. 
6?3 139KA7 
6IDNO. 
3 1??90 
NO PRIOR BOOKING 
v\ 
QTN NO. 
1006 J 1 J 7 
CT6 
I 
CHARGE OR COMMITMENT 
ce. POSS CON »*ROLLI-:D 
(3RD 01 GRl;[ ) 
DOCUMENT NO. 
SU13STANCL 
BAIL OR SENTENCE! 
NO 0A1L 
JUDGE 
31. DJ! 
BOOKED BY 
CHRIS U N S t N 
SEARCHED BY 
Hi I S D N , DAR 
S H I R SERGEANT 
VI AANOLRl N, 
RECORD'S CHECKED BY 
HtHC) 
NCtC 
Nl G 
SHWl 
HI G 
CTTY 
DWN 
OTHER 
JU'I 
. 0 0 
PRINTS I PICTURE 
CO P I C S 3 CARDS 
LAST PHOTO DATE 
0 / / 0 3 / 9 / 
PROPERTY HELD BY 
SI C POI 1 CI 
PROPERTY HELD N EVIDENCE 
CONTROL 1.1 0 SUMS'! ANCL 
p o e — m — 
SAi .1 LAKl: 
CAR IMPOUND LOCATION 
SEX 
MAI L 
RACE 
H I S P A N I C 
AGE HEIGHT 
bOb 
WEIGHT HAIR 
HRN 
EYES S O C SEC. NO 
b?6P 06- 1?96 
DRIVER'S LIC. NO. 
SUSP LIT 
SCARS, TATTOOS. MARKS 
SCAR 
I A T I 0 0 
SCAR 
LOCATION 
J : : iT 
t LI "I 
O:NU::R 
LOWlIR 
LOWLR 
LOWIiR 
ARM 
ARM 
AHOOMKN 
DESCRIPTION 
3 1NCHKS 
"DROOPY*1 
\' SURG 
P A HANDED 
MCHV HNU 
EYE GLASSES 
OCCUPATION 
ROOf LR 
HOME ADDRESS 
3F.<S0 Wi ST HI JNVJLW 
2»P CrTY, STATE 
WV, Ul 
HOME PHONE NO. 
633-3b£*H 
EMERGENCY: NOTIFY (NAME ADDRESS) 
l-L .1/AUK I I I ALIRLJS 19G0 S WKSTIKHPLM ST 
RELATION GrWTnTTR 
SLC> UY 
EMERG PHONE NO. 
1 8 4 • 3 9 S S 
GOVT. EMP. R U 
Wl-sr VALLMY. Ul 
EMPLOYED BY <NAME ADDRESS) 
SVATKW1DL ROOKING 
WORK PHONE NO. 
9fcS -660S 
ARREST I t S 
CONDITION 
| INTOX 
NO 
SICK 
NO 
MJUR£0 
NO 
MED 
NO 
EXPLAIN 
>! i KLDJCAL SCRLTNING RLPORl 
REMARKS 
E*^T;?Rr5$*p DATE 
L . i ^ i i ^ a j y L 0 5 j 8 S 7 
TIME 
RELEASED BY 
Hohenshelt 
APPROVED BY 
Sgt. Parker 
MEDICAL SCREENER 
!HOM/\S, MICH 
REASON FOR RELEASE 
BOND SANONE 
j r •>"') 4*42 t> ; / '03/v»7 J-*) 04 97J4VM? 0 7 / 0 3 / 9 7 I M 0 4 i*7 M ' . M * 0 " ' . ' » O / ^ 7 ; J t*'; 
II M ^ V l t i l C K . W t n K U J/MN N A V ' I N ! t K , W t M * £ l . L NMN M A V i r i K K . L V l ^ l l l Nr,N 
K - S : U l / u V / 7 1 H V R A U i H DCDi 0 1 / 0 7 / 7 1 H K'ACt i H L ' lHt U l / 0 7 y 7 l H F V U : H 
n,~K>S;% CONIKOLLLL' SUiTSlA CG~PoSS COrt'MCOL LCD SOBS'IA ( 0 -POSS C U N I R . X L I O SH;.v>» 
1 / . J1. : MO (:V\ } I HA J t i NO HA J I / HA H x NO HA 11 
M.L«ot : SL HJS1 J U i ^ t I S t DJS1 J U P ^ : St. CM 3 I 
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ADDENDUM D 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
WENDELL NAVANICK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.971015158FS 
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for 
hearing before the Court on February 20, 1998. Defendant was present and was 
represented by his counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and 
the State of Utah was represented by N. M. D'Alesandro, Deputy District Attorney. 
Defendant moved to suppress the search and seizure of amphetamine, a controlled 
substance, on the grounds that it was seized pursuant to an illegal arrest and search. More 
specifically, defendant argued that the police did not have a facially valid warrant nor 
probable cause to arrest the defendant. Defendant further argued that even if the arrest 
warrant that the police relied upon in arresting defendant was facially valid, his was a 
hAtf 1 0 1998 
By lYrfA <a^ 
Deputy Clark 
case of mistaken identity caused by the failure of the police to take reasonable steps to 
confirm the identity of the person sought in the warrant. 
Having considered the motion, memorandum, and reply brief filed by the 
defendant, the memorandum filed by the State, oral argument, exhibits admitted into 
evidence, the sworn testimony of witnesses, including the defendant, Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Deputy Brenda Christensen, Salt Lake City Police Officers Bryan Bailey and 
Todd Mitchell, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant is charged by Information with one count of Unlawful Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. 
2. Defendant is alleged to have been in possession of amphetamine, a Schedule II 
controlled substance. 
3. The Information is based on activities that took place on July 3, 1997, at a 
Motel 6 at 1990 West North Temple and at the Metro Jail in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
4. On July 3, 1997, while on duty, Salt Lake City Police Detective Bryan Bailey 
received a telephone call from the manager of a Motel 6 in Salt Lake City reporting 
suspicious activity in room 148. 
5. The manager told the police that a "Wendell Navanick" was registered in room 
148. 
6. Detective Bailey, busy with another matter, asked Salt Lake City Police 
Detective Todd Mitchell to investigate. 
7. Detective Mitchell called police dispatch by telephone and asked them to 
check the name "Wendell Navanick" for warrants. 
8. The dispatcher informed Detective Mitchell that there was a warrant for a 
person with that name and the date of birth of 11/27/71. 
9. An arrest warrant for "Wendall Navanick," with an address of "1985 South 
200 East, SLC, UT 84115," date of birth "11/27/71," on a charge of telephone harassment 
was signed by Judge Judith Atherton, Third District Court, West Valley Department, on 
May 7, 1997. 
10. Bail on the warrant was set at $1000.00. 
11. No physical description was provided on the warrant. 
12. Detective Mitchell checked the police department's computerized records and 
determined that there were two dates of birth associated with the name Wendell 
Navanick, 11/27/71, and an alias date of birth of 1/7/71. 
13. Detective Mitchell went to room 148 of the Motel 6, 1990 West North 
Temple, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on July 3, 1997. 
14. The door to room 148 opened and two women and a man were seen inside. 
15. The man inside the room was identified as the defendant, Wendell Navanick. 
16. An officer accompanying Detective Mitchell recognized the man in room 148 
as Wendell Navanick. 
17. Defendant told Detective Mitchell that his date of birth was 1/7/71, which 
was consistent with the information that Detective Mitchell had obtained from police 
records. 
18. Defendant was informed of the warrant and denied that he was the person 
named in the warrant. 
19. Defendant's testimony was not credible. 
20. Defendant had no identification to show to the police. 
21. Although "Wendell Navanick" is an uncommon name, at least two persons by 
that name, including the defendant, have been booked into the Salt Lake County Jail. 
22. Defendant had used names other than Wendell Navanick in the past. 
23. Detective Mitchell stated that suspects often gave him false names and dates 
of birth. 
24. Defendant was arrested on the warrant and taken to the Salt Lake Metro Jail 
in Salt Lake County. 
25. During a routine booking search of the defendant's pockets, a correctional 
officer allegedly found a plastic twist containing amphetamine. 
26. No search warrant had been issued prior to the booking search. 
8. There are insufficient facts to suggest that the police were required to have 
employed any other efforts to confirm the identity of the defendant than the efforts they 
diil in lad cmplu'i 
defendant w as la^ \ fii ill;; arrested. 
..-King searcl • ii recognized euepiii in tin ^*au In i\.nraiit 
requirement. 
Defendant was lawfully searched. 
11 in >r M j spected amphetamine was lawfully seized. 
I H I M i tins / 0 t i n ui , flus^cS^ • 1998. 
BY IHJbUJl 
ONE E. MEDLEY, Judge 
Approved as to form; t//^A ex cepfr0r>f AoteJ /n £6jec'/ c J&^/yaftn/f 
Ralph Dellapiana 
Attorney for Defendant 
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